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What is really going on?
Narratives and ethical assessments in recent 
Anglophone debates over peace and war
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz präsentiert eine Reihe von zeitgenössischen Ansichten über die  Theorie des 
gerechten Krieges, Gewaltfreiheit und nukleare Abschreckung, um daran zu veranschau-
lichen, wie moralische Urteile von der empirischen Bewertung darüber abhängen, was 
in der Welt vor sich geht. Angesichts der Komplexität der modernen Gewalt erkennen 
Befürworter des Pazifismus und der  Theorie des gerechten Krieges an, dass es unmög-
lich ist, eine moralische Haltung zu finden, die jede Komplizenschaft mit Gewalt ver-
meidet. Aber gewaltfreie Ansätze können, wenn sie ethisch genutzt werden, Hoffnung 
auf authentischere christliche – und auch effektivere – Wege zur Friedenssicherung mit 
Gerechtigkeit bieten.
Abstract
This paper presents a range of contemporary views about just war theory, nonviolence, 
and nuclear deterrence, to illustrate how moral judgments depend upon empirical 
 assessments of what is going on in the world. Given the complexity of modern violence, 
advocates of both pacifism and just war theory acknowledge that it is impossible to 
find a moral stance that avoids all complicity with violence. Yet nonviolent approaches, 
if used ethically, can offer hope for more authentically Christian – and also more effec-
tive – ways of pursuing peace with justice.
1 Introduction
It is quite difficult for ethicists to draw conclusions about how best to 
promote peace in the world, and whether just war or humanitarian inter-
ventions might be ways to do so, when we cannot agree on the facts of 
the cases involved. What are the greatest threats to peace? What is the 
best way to pursue peace with justice? Anyone who is serious about the 
vocation of peacemaking must take into consideration what actually is 
effective in bringing about genuine peace in the world, even if effective-
ness is not the sole criterion that concerns ethicists. Nevertheless, some of 
the most important questions in peace ethics now are how to deal with 
empirical questions. Frequently, the ways that these empirical questions 
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become most evident is in the narratives that we use to describe both 
historical and contemporary ideas and events. Thus, this paper will focus 
on some of the key narratives that have appeared in recent Anglophone 
conversations about peace and war.
2 Narratives about peace and war, from the early  
church to the contemporary situation
How do we tell the story of war and peace? Whether we are talking about 
the past or the present, events and their moral significance can be part 
of very different types of stories. One way this appears is in accounts 
of the history of Christian thought about war and peace. There is the 
account of a pure early Church, unsullied by war, which was corrupted 
by Constantine and Augustine and the rise of just war theory. Here, 
the trajectory is clearly one of decline. On the other hand, there is the 
story of Christians struggling, through history, to reconcile the Gospel 
with their increasing political responsibilities and desire to protect the 
vulnerable. In this second “story”, the principles of just war theory are 
developed as ways of guiding those political leaders who were  attempting 
to protect their neighbors. (See Prusak 2018)
These narratives about peace and war are not new, of course, but it is 
interesting to see how they are playing out in the contemporary context. 
For instance, these stories are being re- told amidst the current, lively 
debate about the status of nonviolence and just war theory in the Catholic 
Church. Some ethicists describe the recent trajectory of Catholic teaching 
as moving towards a rejection of all war, and an endorsement of non-
violence as the sole acceptable stance. The formal appeal released by the 
Catholic Nonviolence Initiative after their conference at the Vatican in 2016 
called for the Catholic Church to “re- commit” to the centrality of Gospel 
nonviolence. The word “re- commit” recalls the presumed pacifism of the 
early Church. And in the statement itself, there is a call for the Church to 
“no longer use or teach ‘just war theory’”, because the drafters believe the 
recent trajectory of Catholic teaching is moving in a different direction:
“We need a new framework that is consistent with Gospel nonviolence. A  different 
path is clearly unfolding in recent Catholic social teaching. Pope John XXIII 
wrote that war is not a suitable way to restore rights; Pope Paul VI linked peace 
and development, and told the UN ‘no more war’; Pope John Paul II said that 
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‘war belongs to the tragic past, to history’; Pope Benedict XVI said that ‘loving 
the enemy is the nucleus of the Christian revolution’; and Pope Francis said 
‘the true strength of the Christian is the power of truth and love, which leads 
to the renunciation of all violence. Faith and violence are incompatible’. He 
has also urged the ‘abolition of war’.” 1
Indeed, the focus on papal teaching, particularly the Second Vatican 
Council and Pacem in Terris, has been on the condemnation of the hor-
rors of war, and not on the discussion of what might constitute a just 
war. Lisa Cahill (2018) writes that “no pope since Vatican II has explicitly 
defended just war theory or used just war criteria to validate a specific 
use of force. In fact, the popes often sound as if they are condemning 
armed force entirely and under any circumstances.” However, papal 
teaching has never explicitly rejected just war theory, and Cahill goes 
on to say that “[…] paradoxically, these same popes all retain a place 
for self- defense and/or humanitarian intervention, at least in principle.” 
Cahill is certainly correct that the emphasis in recent papal teaching is 
on finding alternatives to war. Yet is this a story of a doctrinal change? 
Or is it the natural evolution of a consistent teaching that is responding 
to shifts in the reality of modern warfare?
Christian Braun argues that the just war theory has not been aban-
doned; he suggests that the shift is a rhetorical one, rather than a substan-
tive one. Recent popes, he explains, have chosen to speak primarily in a 
prophetic mode and focus on nonviolence. This is indeed a  significant 
shift in emphasis, but Pope Francis has chosen to “[…] forcefully stress 
the tools of nonviolence within the just war framework […]. The Holy 
Father follows the path determined by his immediate predecessors. While 
he thus continues to uphold the just war framework, Francis can con-
centrate exclusively on the virtue of nonviolence in his role as Vicar of 
Christ.” (Braun 2018, 64) Braun’s narrative, then, is one which retains 
a sense of continuity, even as he acknowledges the new prominence of 
nonviolence.
It is not only the history of Catholic teaching which is being told and 
re- told in rather different ways. Recent historical events can also be nar-
rated in divergent ways. For many years, the stories of the Holocaust 
1 Available at <https://nonviolencejustpeace.net/final- statement- an- appeal- to- the- 
catholic- church- to- re- commit- to- the- centrality- of- gospel- nonviolence>.
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and World War II profoundly shaped ethics and theology. Today, the 
stories of Srebrenica, the Rwandan genocide, the war in Syria, and the 
Rohingya genocide loom large. These stories – including those that are 
ongoing – are often highlighted by those who would advocate the pos-
sibility of using military force for humanitarian interventions. Even for 
pacifists, these are important stories that raise difficult questions. For 
example, William O’Neill describes how his visit to churches that had 
been the sites of massacres during the Rwandan genocide led him to 
acknowledge that there may be a place for just- war thinking in Chris-
tian discipleship. He writes,
“As I visited these churches, filled with bodies still, bodies left as a memorial, my 
own pacifist convictions were deeply challenged. For had U. N. peacekeepers 
not summarily been withdrawn at the behest of the U. S. and the former colo-
nial regimes, countless lives most likely would have been saved […]. I remain a 
pacifist, in part as a consecrated religious Jesuit. But I am not prepared to con-
demn those who think otherwise, e. g., troops who would defend the innocent. 
Indeed, I would endorse their doing so.” (O’Neill 2018, 116)
O’Neill is not the only theologian who has re- thought his perspective 
in light of Rwanda. Many other thinkers are wrestling with the role of 
military intervention in attempting to stop atrocities and promote a just 
peace. The conclusions they draw are often very much related to how 
they tell the stories. The proponents of military intervention point to 
Srebrenica, Rwanda and Syria as examples of situations in which a more 
robust military intervention might have saved many lives. Yet others focus 
on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, where interventions have led mostly 
to failed states. This shows, they argue, that interventions – particularly 
those that are not authorized by the UN – are doomed to fail.
The UN is a frequent actor in these stories, particularly in its peace-
keeping role. Nigel Biggar tells the stories of the Rwandan genocide 
and the Srebrenica massacre as examples of the failures of the UN 
and international law to provide a robust enough framework for the 
promotion of justice. He argues that unilateral military interven-
tions may be moral, according to the just war theory, even if they 
violate international law. (See Biggar 2015) Mary Ellen O’Connell 
disagrees, arguing that respect for international law is the best way 
to promote peace with justice. She cites the illegal invasion of Iraq in 
2003 as a story in which the US failed to respect international law – a 
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decision which has had many repercussions for peace in the Mid-
dle East. (See  O’Connell 2015) One of the most interesting aspects 
of the debate between O’Connell and Biggar, however, is that both 
clearly  acknowledge that they are telling different stories. O’Connell 
says that Biggar simply has the facts wrong about Rwanda and Sre-
brenica. (See ibid., 41 – 42) Biggar, too, says that their disagreement is 
 primarily an empirical one, about whether or not military intervention 
is likely to be effective. He disputes her claim that “[a]mple evidence 
demonstrates that outside intervention in civil wars does not lead to 
the positive outcomes predicted by unilateral intervention advocates.” 
(Biggar 2015, 59) Thus, they are both making arguments about what 
is most likely to promote peace, based on their assessments of recent 
history – but they describe that history differently and therefore draw 
very different conclusions.
3 Just war theory and what is really going on
In recent conversations about just war theory, the most crucial ques-
tions have been about whether or not just war theory is an effective 
way of promoting peace and justice in the world today. What is really 
going on when we discuss whether or not a war is just? There is no 
question that just war theory has frequently been abused. Pope  Francis 
has referred explicitly to this danger: “we […] need to remember how 
many times, using this excuse of stopping an unjust aggressor, the 
powerful nations have dominated other peoples, made a real war of 
conquest.” (Rocca 2014) Yet some advocates of the just war theory 
maintain that it continues to serve as an important restraint, and so 
should continue to be used and taught. The basic disagreement here 
often is an empirical one.
Gerald Schlabach (2017) is one of those who believes the Catholic 
Church should dispense with the just war theory because he believes that, 
more often than not, it does not succeed in limiting war or promoting 
peace. “Even when just- war discourse aims to limit war,” he writes, “it 
undermines its own best intentions with a meta- message of support for 
war.” Though in theory it can and should be helpful in creating a more 
moral international system, Schlabach believes that in reality, this is not 
what is taking place. He writes,
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“the logical principle that abusus non tollit usum (misuse of something is no 
argument against its proper use) is simply not convincing as applied to the 
just- war theory. For in order to override both the plain words of Jesus and early 
Christian scruples against all bloodshed, and to justify exceptional recourse 
to violence in order to prevent more violence, the best and perhaps only 
argument has always been some claim of greater realism. But…the persistent 
manipulation of just- war discourse is itself a data point concerning reality, 
a ‘hard fact’ with which its advocates must grapple far more. To evade such 
grappling by insisting it could still work in theory is something of a bait and 
switch.” (Schlabach 2017)
Schlabach’s appeal to “a data point concerning reality” is striking here. 
If just war theory is indeed abused to this extent, he may be correct that 
it is too risky to espouse, even in its more restrictive forms.
However, other ethicists seem to regard just war theory as still an 
important tool in preserving peace by limiting the resort to war. This 
seems to be particularly true of thinkers who themselves have direct 
experience with the military or police. They find that just war theory 
provides important moral guidance for people in their positions. Tobias 
Winright (2018, 147), for instance – a former corrections officer in the 
US – argues that just war theory played an important role in Catho-
lics’ argumentation and advocacy against the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003. However, there is no avoiding the fact that these arguments did 
not succeed in convincing the US president. They may also have been 
undermined by a few thinkers who argued that President Bush’s pro-
posed war could be legitimate according to the just war theory.2 Thus, it 
is not clear whether this incident is a story about the utility of just war 
theory – or about its failures.
When there are widely varying perceptions about what is really going 
on with just war theory, one approach might be to try to give priority 
to the perspective of those who are most vulnerable to the threat of war. 
The preferential option for the poor is partly a hermeneutical approach, 
calling Catholics to attend to the most marginalized perspectives first. 
Lisa Cahill attempts to do this in her reflections on the utility of just 
war theory when she writes,
2 Among these thinkers were George Weigel and Jean Bethke Elshtain.
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“While academics in the U. S. may find just war theory to be a useful tool with 
which to analyze and critique national military initiatives, people in conflict 
zones in the global South see just war theory as spectacularly ineffective in 
restraining violence, much less building a just peace. Concepts like ‘just cause’ 
are more likely to be in use in the ideological validation of violence than in its 
restraint or condemnation.” (Sowle Cahill 2018b, 104)
This is a compelling statement indeed, and it is commendable that 
Cahill is attending to this important perspective. Yet of course there 
are exceptions to it. Surely some of the Christian leaders in the  Middle 
East who were appealing to the outside world for protection from 
ISIS in the past few years would have urged would- be interveners to 
see the cause as a just war.3 Even Pope Francis himself acknowledged 
the need for some sort of protective intervention against ISIS, though 
he avoided speaking directly about military force. Still, other Vatican 
officials were more direct, including Silvio Tomasi, who used the lan-
guage of just war theory when he said, “When all other means have 
been exhausted, to save human beings the international community 
must act. This can include disarming the aggressor.” (Wooden 2014) 
In the same speech, he invoked the story of Rwanda as well: “Tomasi 
recalled the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the fact that the massacre 
of Tutsis by the majority Hutus was on the front page of newspapers 
and was a topic of repeated discussions regionally and internationally, 
but international action was extremely limited. ‘People met, but did 
nothing,’ the archbishop said.” (Ibid.) Indeed, the advocates of just 
war theory cannot be sure that it will always be used appropriately – 
and it is important to listen first to those who are most vulnerable to 
its abuses. But those pacifists who would reject all use of the just war 
theory are hard- pressed to explain how else to shape a moral response 
to the hard cases such as genocide. If we are to genuinely pursue peace 
with justice, it seems that we cannot yet dispense entirely with the 
guidance that the just war theory provides.
3 See, for example, “Christian leaders call for help in face of ISIS onslaught in 
Syria,” Catholic Herald, 3/10/15. <http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2015/03/10/
christian- leaders- call- for- help- in- face- of- isis- onslaught- in- syria>. And, “Syrian 
 Catholic leader demands the West step up against ISIS,” Crux, 1/29/2016. <https://
cruxnow.com/church/2016/01/29/syrian- catholic- leader- demands- the- west- step- up- 
against- isis/>.
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4 “Jus in bello” and what is really going on
While much of the recent debate about just war theory has focused on 
the jus ad bellum as a potential threat to peace, it is also important to 
attend to conversations about the jus in bello. These are two very  different 
discussions, as Bernard Prusak reminds us:
“the principles of jus ad bellum—the criteria that need to be satisfied before 
going to war can be considered morally permissible—and the principles of jus in 
bello—the criteria concerning morally permissible conduct in war— historically 
derive from quite different traditions: ‘Jus in bello is the product of the  medieval 
 chivalric code, the self- regulation of the warrior classes. Jus ad bellum, on the 
other hand, is the invention of churchmen and lawyers and  represents a funda-
mental challenge to the assumptions build into chivalry’, namely, that  ‘military 
life and warfare are an acceptable and potentially noble form of activity’.” (Prusak 
2018, 2. Citing Rodin 2002, 167)
The problem with speaking about jus in bello, then, is that it involves 
an implicit acknowledgment of the legitimacy of being a soldier. If one 
speaks about how knights should behave, one is legitimating knighthood. 
As a recent article on the medieval “Peace of God” movement shows, 
efforts to create rules and standards for dueling and warfare have some-
times worked to reduce overall violence in short term ways. (See Carney 
2018) But the results are rather mixed; the “Peace of God”  standards 
were themselves enforced at the point of the sword. And Carney has 
pointed out that one consequence of the “Peace of God” movement 
was simply the transfer of intra- Christian violence into the violence of 
the Crusades. (Ibid.)
In the contemporary context, jus in bello has also produced mixed 
results. Some efforts to reduce civilian casualties in the short run  simply 
produce more civilian casualties in the long run. The US military engaged 
in precision bombing in the first Gulf War that avoided killing many 
civilians directly. But many facilities such as power plants and water 
treatment facilities were bombed instead. Thus, while casualties  during 
the hostilities were relatively low, “[b]y the end of 1992, more than a 
hundred thousand Iraqi civilians died from the lack of clean water and 
sewage disposal, and the breakdown of electrical service to hospitals.” 
(Lopez 2004) A similar terrible irony exists in the recent battles against 
ISIS. In the name of protecting civilian populations from ISIS, the US 
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and Iraqi forces fighting in the battle to retake Mosul apparently killed 
more than ten thousand civilians. (See George et al. 2017)
Despite these hypocrisies and unintended consequences, even many 
skeptics of just war theory have acknowledged recently that the jus in 
bello criteria still may be the best possibility that exists for limiting the 
savagery of war. Damon Linker (2018), a journalist and author, argues 
that just war thinking has a very mixed record in general, but says that 
jus in bello thinking “has unquestionably had positive consequences, 
 leading to efforts to distinguish legitimate (usually military) targets from 
illegitimate (usually civilian) ones, as well as inspiring serious thinking 
about proportionality in the use of force.” He laments that recent events, 
including the shootings of Gaza protestors by the Israeli military, show 
that support for jus in bello among the US and other governments is 
waning. This is, he says, “the latest in a series of signs that the brief period 
in which the world had reason to hope that warfare was being hemmed 
in by moral considerations may well be drawing to a close. Welcome to 
the post- just- war world.” (Linker 2018)
Linker’s lament is echoed in a different way by Phil Klay, in a deeply 
moving New York Times opinion essay. Klay, a former US Marine, 
appeals to a sense of military honor that is reminiscent of medieval 
codes of  chivalry. However, he traces it to the founding of the US and key 
 American ideals. After describing how his unit provided medical treatment 
to a wounded enemy sniper, he explains that such  consideration for the 
enemy is a key element of the moral standards the US should be  fighting 
to uphold. He traces this back to George Washington, who “ordered 
every soldier in the Continental Army to sign a copy of rules intended 
to limit harm to civilians and ensure that their conduct respected what 
he called ‘the rights of humanity,’ so that their restraint ‘justly secured to 
us the attachment of all good men’.” (Klay 2017) In Klay’s mind, military 
action can only be regarded as legitimate – and as serving the cause of 
peace – if it upholds basic standards of jus in bello. These standards are a 
core aspect of Klay’s identity as a Marine. He writes that enemies should 
expect good treatment from the US military because Marines behave “in 
accordance with the rules of law […]. Because they’re American soldiers, 
because they swore an oath, because they have principles, because they 
have honor. And because without that, there’s nothing worth fighting 
for.” Indeed, Klay knows well that there have been violations of these 
standards – he discusses Abu Ghraib at length. But in his mind, that 
only reinforces the need to cultivate a sense of honor and morality in 
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the conduct of war. Like Damon Linker, Klay thinks that a commitment 
to jus in bello may be the only bulwark against a descent into complete 
brutality. As long as there are soldiers in the world, we are better off if 
they have some sense of honor and principle.
5 Pacifism and what is really going on
Like the discussion about just war theory, recent discussion about paci-
fism is also marked by serious consideration of the ambiguity involved in 
taking a pacifist stance. Even some thinkers who identify themselves as 
pacifists have questioned the perception of pacifism as a morally superior 
option. Myles Werntz is a strong critic of those pacifists in the US who 
would claim a degree of moral purity: “One of the primary temptations 
facing Christians in thinking about war is that churches are absolved of 
involvement in war if they are not directly involved [….] this position 
is not a sustainable claim on economic and political grounds.” (Werntz 
2014, 26) Werntz notes that the US economy and society are profoundly 
shaped by the country’s geopolitical role. US citizens who purchase 
 seemingly innocuous goods are often supporting companies that also 
manufacture weapons or have contracts with the military: “distancing 
oneself from involvement with or support of military ventures in America 
is nearly impossible because the suppliers who provide support and aid 
to military forces are now the same vendors who supply the vast majority 
of American groceries, fuel, housing, and entertainment.” (Ibid., 24) In 
other words, while many Americans might eschew formal cooperation 
with their country’s military excesses, they cannot avoid forms of mate-
rial cooperation that are morally problematic.
The pacifist author Dustin Ells Howes makes a similar point about the 
inevitability of our cooperation with evil. As one reviewer of his book 
A Credible Pacifism summarizes, “all of us are potentially and innately 
 violent, at least in our actions if not our intentions. A kernel of con-
flict and even force lies at the core of our interpersonal relationships, 
economic arrangements, legal mechanisms, patterns of consumption, 
exercises of freedom, and ultimately our very perceptions.” (Amster 
2010, 169) Thus, the idea that pacifism is a way to avoid cooperation or 
complicity with the evils of war is, finally, misguided. Despite our best 
intentions, Howes points out that our actions frequently contribute to 
serious forms of injustice and violence.
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Other thinkers are also reiterating more traditional critiques of paci-
fism, particularly in relation to pacifists’ refusal to use violence to  protect 
 others. As Lisa Cahill writes, even “the absolute renunciation of all poten-
tially mortal force can place the agent in a position of complicity with 
grievous evils perpetrated against the innocent, turning nonviolent yet 
responsible agents into ‘guilty bystanders.’” (Sowle Cahill 2018a, 106) 
Nigel Biggar – a staunch critic of pacifism – states it even more strongly 
when he asks what sort of peace it is that pacifists are seeking:
“Peace is not simple. Like war, it too involves evils, tragedies, ambiguities, risks, 
and uncertainties. The fact that the United Kingdom and the United States 
stayed at peace in 1994 left Ratko Mladic at peace to seriously disturb the peace 
of the seven thousand men and boys he slaughtered at Srebrenica; the fact that 
we, the international community, stayed at peace in 1995 left the Hutu at peace 
to seriously disturb the peace of the eight hundred thousand Tutsis they hacked 
to death in Rwanda; and, were we to stay at peace in 2015, we would leave the 
self- styled Islamic State at peace to atrociously disturb the peace of the Yazidis, 
Kurds, and Iraqis […]. I cannot take ‘peace’ at face value. I need to know what 
kind of peace, whose peace, and at whose cost […]. Those who argue for ‘not- 
war’ have to justify themselves, too.” (Biggar 2015, 54)4
When our neighbors are threatened with violence, there may be no way 
we can avoid tragic consequences – whether we seek to prevent violence 
with violence ourselves, or whether we remain nonviolent. While it is 
easy to point out the many injustices that wars cause, Biggar reminds us 
that advocating against war may also lead to serious injustice.
6 Nonviolence and what is really going on
Nevertheless, the fact that any course of action may lead to tragic conse-
quences does not mean that we need not prefer some courses of action to 
others, both for moral and for practical reasons. Many Christian ethicists, 
in addition to Pope Francis in his World Day of Peace Message for 2017, 
are calling attention to nonviolence as a method of addressing injustices 
4 Biggar (2013) makes a similar, more extended argument in his book, In Defence 
of War.
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that is both effective and morally preferable in many cases. This does 
not mean that nonviolent action is not also subject to the same moral 
ambiguities that plague pacifism and just war thinking. Still, new work 
in the social sciences offers fresh approaches to thinking about how the 
vocation to be peacemakers can actually be carried out in political terms. 
The current conversation about nonviolence and peacebuilding, there-
fore, tends to transcend the traditional dichotomy between “idealistic” 
pacifists and “realist” just- war theorists, and avoids some of the pitfalls 
of both approaches.
One important work of social science that has made a major con-
tribution to the conversation about nonviolence is Chenoweth and 
Stephan’s Why Civil Resistance Works. They examined over 300 major 
political campaigns from 1900 to 2006, around the world. These included 
regime change movements, secession movements, and anti- occupation 
movements. They compared movements that were primarily nonvio-
lent with those which were partly or completely violent, and concluded 
from the data that “nonviolent resistance has been strategically superior 
to violent resistance.” (Chenoweth/Stephan 2011, 17) They also showed 
that the key criterion for an effective movement is what percentage 
of the  population participates. Because nonviolent movements have 
fewer  barriers to participation, they can draw a higher percentage of the 
 population.  People of all ages and genders can participate, and you need 
not own a weapon. The diversity of these movements also make them 
less vulnerable to infiltration by security forces. All of this adds up to a 
greater likelihood of success. Their research also shows that even unsuc-
cessful nonviolent movements are far more likely than violent ones to lead 
to democracy in the coming years. Chenoweth and Stephan make clear 
that their argument is an empirical one, not a religious or ethical one. 
“Civil resistance does not succeed because it melts the hearts of dictators 
and secret police,” they write. “It succeeds because it is more likely than 
armed struggle to attract a larger and more diverse base of participants 
and impose unsustainable costs on a regime.” (Chenoweth/Stephan 
2014, 96) Yet their work – and that of other social scientists writing on 
nonviolence, peacebuilding, and violence prevention – clearly enlarges 
the scope of possibilities that must be considered by Christian ethicists.
Yet just like pacifism and just war theory, nonviolence merits a nuanced 
approach. As thinkers from Gandhi to Niebuhr to James Childress 
have pointed out, non- violent action is a form of power and, like other 
forms of power, may be abused. As Dustin Ells Howes (2009, 10) writes, 
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“Power that does not employ physical violence is still potentially destruc-
tive and unjust. And even if physical violence always retains an aspect 
of immorality […] sometimes our nonphysical actions are worse than 
physical harm.” The potential danger inherent in nonviolent action is 
already acknowledged in Gaudium et Spes, even as it affirms its impor-
tance: “we cannot fail to praise those who renounce the use of violence 
in the vindication of their rights and who resort to methods of defense 
which are otherwise available to weaker parties too, provided this can 
be done without injury to the rights and duties of others or of the com-
munity itself.” (GS 78)
Still, the moral and political advantages of using nonviolent means to 
pursue justice are clear. Many writers have noted that nonviolent cam-
paigns tend to provoke less backlash, reducing the chances of creating 
an ongoing cycle of violence and retribution. Other authors focus on 
the importance of nonviolence for creating fruitful political dialogue. 
Howes, for instance, argues that nonviolence allows conversation and 
dialogue to continue, increasing the chances of creating a just outcome 
for all. Given “our limited ability to know what to do and the difficulty 
of attending to the physical and material suffering of others […], speech, 
diplomacy, and civil disobedience all ensure that others can at least 
express that the exercise of nonviolent power is unjust.” (Howes 2009, 
10 – 11) Just as Chenoweth and Stephan affirm, Howes believes that even 
unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns may produce better outcomes in the 
long run, because this ongoing dialogue is what is most crucial for justice 
and democracy. Robert Holmes, too, echoes this focus on dialogue, in 
terms that are reminiscent of Gandhi’s “experiments with truth”:
“Violence is for the morally infallible. Nonviolence is for those who recognize 
their own limitations and the possibility that others, with whom they are in 
disagreement, have hold of certain parts of the truth, and are willing to put 
forth the effort to uncover and cultivate that truth in the interests of nonviolent 
conciliation.” (Cicovacki 2013, 197)
Or, to put it quite bluntly, “[r]efraining from killing others ensures that 
we remain perpetually open to correction.” (Howes 2009, 9)
However one understands the advantages or goals of nonviolence, an 
important area of future development is ethical guidelines for the use of 
nonviolent force. Just because it is not violent does not mean it is auto-
matically moral or that it is being used in a way that promotes justice 
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overall; nonviolent force can be used for good or for less good goals, and 
in proportionate or disproportionate ways. Anna Floerke Scheid’s book Just 
Revolution (2015) is very helpful in this regard, as she brings the traditional 
criteria of just war theory to bear on contemporary campaigns for regime 
change. While she does not rule out the use of violent force as legitimate 
in some circumstances, she argues that nonviolent means should always 
be primary. Her work echoes an earlier argument by James Childress that 
“the appropriate criteria for evaluating civil disobedience coincide to a great 
extent with traditional just war criteria such as just cause, good motives and 
intentions, exhaustion of normal procedures for resolving disputes, reason-
able prospect for success, due proportion between probable good and bad 
consequences, and right means.” (Childress 1971, 204) Scheid goes further, 
though, to adapt the criteria of just war theory for use in situations of non-
violent action. For instance, she proposes a refinement to the criterion of 
“right intention”: not only is it necessary for a revolutionary to intend a just 
peace as her goal, but the intracommunal nature of a revolution requires 
that its proponents go even further, and intend reconciliation as the final 
goal. Furthermore, right intention implies careful thought about what 
comes after a campaign. As the difficult aftermath of the Arab Spring has 
shown (particularly in Egypt), to build an effective nonviolent campaign 
is one thing; building a sustainable democracy is another.
One lingering question is how the morality of nonviolence may relate 
to its practical effectiveness. While there are many ways to approach 
that question, it is particularly interesting to see how some pacifists are 
engaging it, given that pacifists have sometimes been accused of lacking 
a sense of responsibility for the world. For example, in his book Bodies of 
Peace, Myles Werntz is hesitant to stake his arguments for nonviolence on 
any claims for its empirical effectiveness. Instead, he argues for nonvio-
lence primarily as a form of Christian discipleship and witness. However, 
this does not mean that Christians should not attend carefully to the 
effects and effectiveness of their actions. He rejects the oft- heard claim 
that Jesus merely calls us to be faithful, not effective. Rather, he explains,
“I am not retreating again into a theoretical account of nonviolence or  arguing 
that those who refuse to participate in war are excused from the burden of 
accounting for the successes of violence or the failures of nonviolence. Rather, 
[nonviolence] is a social possibility that begins as a theological reality, to the 
extent that the act of nonviolence – as a social strategy – is derivative of and is 
a witness to the work of God.” (Werntz 2014, 15)
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He urges, therefore, that Christians think carefully about the forms of 
Christian life and church life which can best reflect and embody our 
vocations as followers of Christ – and nonviolence is a key element of that.
7 Nuclear weapons and what is really going on 5
One of the most challenging areas of witness for Christians in the world 
today is in relation to nuclear weapons. Nuclear tensions between the 
US and North Korea, particularly given the presence of two unstable 
leaders in these two states, have added urgency to the conversation about 
nuclear disarmament. Yet there remain disagreements among ethicists 
about how best to proceed, particularly when it comes to understanding 
what is going on in two key areas: first, what is going on with nuclear 
deterrence? And second, what is the function of the recently passed UN 
nuclear weapons ban treaty?
When the UN passed the ban in July of 2017, the Vatican was a major 
champion of that treaty and was among the very first countries to ratify 
it. Subsequently, the Vatican hosted a symposium entitled “Prospects for 
a World Free of Nuclear Weapons and for Integral Disarmament” which 
gathered UN and NATO officials as well as 11 Nobel Peace Prize winners, 
including representatives of the 2017 awardees, the International Cam-
paign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. During the symposium, Pope Francis 
made a striking statement about nuclear weapons. Moving well beyond 
past condemnations of the use of nuclear weapons, he condemned the 
“very possession” of nuclear weapons. (See Pope Francis 2017)
Many of those who supported the UN ban, and were in attendance at 
the Vatican symposium, did so because they believed that the ban could 
be an effective way to stigmatize the possession of nuclear weapons and 
therefore make it more likely that countries will disarm. They envision 
a trajectory of increasing rejection of nuclear weapons in international 
public opinion. And by telling stories of the suffering at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, they have sought to highlight the humanitarian consequences of 
any use of such weapons. The activists with the International Campaign 
5 Portions of this section are taken from my blog post “Nuclear Deterrence: 
When an Interim Ethic Reaches its Expiration Date” on Political Theology Today. 
<https://politicaltheology.com/nuclear- deterrence- when- an- interim- ethic- reaches- its- 
expiration- date>.
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to Abolish Nuclear Weapons have thus sought to create a narrative in 
which all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, come 
to be regarded as illegal under international law. There is no doubt that 
their efforts are important and have indeed served to raise awareness of 
the dangers of nuclear weapons. However, some ethicists suggest that 
such a ban is not, in fact, an effective way to reduce the threat of nuclear 
weapons in the world today. Because none of the states which currently 
possess nuclear weapons will ratify the ban, there is a real question about 
whether it will have any effect on states’ behavior. Thus, some thinkers, 
particularly from nuclear states, have argued that the ban does more to 
undermine respect for international law than it actually accomplishes.6 
Instead of creating a ban that will inevitably be ignored, they suggest that 
it would be more productive for the international community to focus 
on support for existing legal instruments such as the Non- Proliferation 
Treaty, or other more incremental efforts.
When it comes to the question of nuclear deterrence, there are also dif-
ferences in how the current situation is described. In the past, Catholic 
leaders offered a limited acceptance of the morality of nuclear deterrence 
because of an assessment that deterrence was preventing the actual use 
of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, Pope John Paul II wrote, “in 
current conditions ‘deterrence’ based on balance, certainly not as an end 
in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may 
still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless, in order to ensure peace, 
it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum which is always 
susceptible to the real danger of explosion.” (Pope John Paul II 1982) The 
acceptance of deterrence was therefore conditional. Today, it is not clear 
that the conditions still apply. There are two reasons for this: first, deter-
rence was conditionally justified as “a step on the way toward a progressive 
disarmament,” but this disarmament is not taking place in a serious way. 
As Archbishop Celestino Migliore, the then- Vatican representative at the 
UN, said in a lecture in 2010: “It is evident that nuclear deterrence is pre-
venting genuine nuclear disarmament. Consequently, the conditions that 
prevailed during the Cold War, which gave a basis for the Church’s limited 
toleration of nuclear deterrence, no longer apply.” (Reese 2010) Second, 
deterrence was justified on the basis of its utility, and that strategic utility 
6 For a detailed debate about the implications of the UN ban treaty, see Shetty/
Raynova 2017.
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is now being called into serious question by the strategists themselves. In a 
dramatic series of op- eds over several years, former cold warriors from both 
political parties have called instead for complete nuclear  disarmament, or 
“Going to Zero”. The so called “Gang of Four” – George Shultz, Henry 
Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn – have argued that:
“The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know- how and nuclear 
material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility 
that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands. The 
steps we are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger. 
With nuclear weapons more widely available, deterrence is decreasingly effective 
and increasingly hazardous.” (Shultz et al 2008)
Some observers disagree with this assessment, however, and claim that 
deterrence remains an important way of stabilizing the international sys-
tem. “Nuclear disarmament,” Michael Desch argues, “would be a recipe for 
blackmail by rogue states or even renewed great- power conflict.” (Desch 
2018) Until a viable alternative emerges, Desch and others believe that deter-
rence may still be morally justified as the best option currently available.
How can we promote just peace in a world where nuclear weapons 
exist? Though there is wide consensus that the use of nuclear weapons is 
completely immoral, it is not always clear how best to prevent that use. 
Our ethical assessments are highly dependent on how we see the current 
status of nuclear deterrence, and whether or not we see value in a treaty 
that goes unsigned by many of the most powerful states in the world.
8 Conclusion
One might think that, after centuries of debate, there would be no new 
arguments in the Christian conversation about war and peace. However, 
history is complex and ever changing. Humans are endlessly  creative at 
finding ways to wage war and also to prevent it. The pursuit of just peace 
is one which will always require innovation and imagination. While there 
are aspects of the tradition that can be helpful – including, perhaps, just 
war theory – it is clear that new approaches are also necessary. How can 
we harness the power of nonviolence in just ways? How can social media 
become a tool for dialogue rather than division? As Maryann Cusimano 
Love (2018, 60) recently wrote: “Just war theory tells us how to limit 
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violence and that force should be a last resort, but it tells us nothing 
about first resorts, or, in other words, about how to build sustainable 
peace.” To that end, it is important that Christian communities are 
spaces in which stories of hope and peace may be told and retold. Yet it 
is also important that we be open to new stories. As ethicists, our desire 
to be clear and systematic may sometimes be at odds with understanding 
what is really going on in the world, and the ways the Holy Spirit may 
surprise us. In speaking about the ways that Christians should engage 
in political life today, Luke Bretherton cautions that:
“any attempt to arrive at a definitive classification not only ignores changes in 
historical context but also the dynamic relationship between the prior actions 
of Christ and different dimensions of society whereby Christ’s Lordship comes 
to be exercised in different degrees over different aspect of society at different 
times. Accordingly, Christians need to develop the ability to improvise faith-
fully in response to Christ within a variety of different political environments.” 
(Bretherton 2010, 21)
Faithful improvisation is indeed a helpful way to approach our task. 
But I would add that we need to carry out such faithful improvisation 
with as clear a sense as possible of what is going on in the world. To that 
end, ethicists themselves must continue the ongoing dialogue about the 
“signs of the times” and what we see in the world around us – informed 
by many voices and many narratives.
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